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Abstract 
The following paper presents the basic concept for the Democracy Ranking 
of the Quality of Democracy and positions this approach in context of 
academic discourses about democracy and the quality of democracy. Key 
dimensions of democracy are freedom, equality and control. Quality-of-
democracy models commonly emphasize a democracy understanding that is 
broader than earlier concepts of primarily electoral democracies. Different 
global democracy and democratization measurement initiatives (Freedom 
House, Polity IV, Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy, and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy) are reviewed and compared. The 
Democracy Ranking underscores a conceptualization of the Quality of 
Democracy = Quality of Politics + Quality of Society. The conceptual 
formula for the Democracy Ranking (see Figure 5 in Chapter 5), therefore, 
may be summarized as: quality of democracy = (freedom + other 
characteristics of the political system) + (performance of the non-
political dimensions). This formula offers an opportunity for creating 
regularly conducted indicator-based rankings of countries, based on the 
quality of their democracy. 
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1. What is democracy? Short review of conceptual definitions 
There exists not only one theory, concept or model of democracy, but 
clearly a pluralism (or plurality) of different theories and models.1 Partially 
these varying theories or concepts could be integrated by a meta-theory or 
meta-concept; at the same time, however, it also should be acknowledged 
that some of those theories and concepts of democracy clearly contradict 
each other. This undoubtedly complicates every attempt of trying to set up 
and establish on a meta-level a process of theory/concept integration. 
Representatively, we may cite Bühlmann (et al. 2008, p. 5): “There is an 
abundant literature relating to democracy theory, with countless definitions 
of what democracy should be and what democracy is.” We can add on by 
referring to Laza Kekic (2007, p. 1): “There is no consensus on how to 
measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested and there is an 
ongoing lively debate on the subject.” 
In a first step, reflecting current mainstream understanding of democracy, 
one can refer to the free encyclopedia and online resource of Wikipedia.2 
Under the keyword of democracy, Wikipedia offers the following 
definition: “Democracy is a system of government by which political 
sovereignty is retained by the people and exercised directly by citizens.”3 
The same Wikpedia website also addresses in more detail different forms of 
democracy (e.g., parliamentary democracy, liberal democracy, direct 
democracy, socialist democracy, consensus democracy, supranational 
                                     
1) In an attempt of relating “theory”, “concept” and “model”, one may postulate: a 
theory is more aggregative than a concept and in frequent cases also more 
aggregative than a model. Of course we also could design models for comparing 
and bridging (linking) different theories. 
2) Free accessibility of information on the internet often is being regarded as a 
prerequisite for classifying information as a “globally available knowledge” that 
may fulfil certain conceptual benchmark functions for general definitions. 
Internet-based information provides the opportunity for serving as focal points for 
trans-national debates and discourses. (In Chapter 3 we will show that access to 
the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit requires a subscription 
of the Economist.) 
3) See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy (all indicated website addresses in 
this paper were retrieved during September 2008) 
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democracy, and non-government democracy).4 In etymological terms, the 
word democracy comes from ancient Greek δημοκρατία (dēmokratiā), 
which combines dēmos, the “people”, with kratos, meaning “rule”, “power” 
or “strength”. Put together, the literal denotation of democracy is “rule by 
the people”, culminating in a popular form of government. The historic 
origin of democracy roots in the Ancient Greek city-states of the fifth 
century BC, with Athens as the most prominent example.5 Influential for 
modern politics (with regard to a frequent referencing) is the so-called 
“Gettysburg Address” of the U.S. president Abraham Lincoln (November 
19, 1863), who coined democracy as a “government of the people, by the 
people, for the people”.6 
Some conceptual work of academic scholars explicitly reviews the 
conceptual diversity of theoretical framing attempts of democracy (e.g., 
Bühlmann et al., 2008; Schmidt, 2006). Michael J. Sodaro (2004, pp. 31, ), 
for example, defines democracy as: “The essential idea of democracy is that 
the people have the right to determine who governs them. In most cases 
they elect the principal governing officials and hold them accountable for 
their actions. Democracies also impose legal limits on the government’s 
authority by guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms to their citizens.” In 
addition, Sodaro (2004, pp. 164, 182) introduces further conceptual aspects 
or the “four faces of democracy”: popular sovereignty7; rights and 
                                     
4) Moving on a continuum “scale of popular sovereignty” from “indirect” to 
“direct” democracy, Sodaro (2004, p. 168) plots the following concepts: 
representative democracy; plebiscitary democracy; techno-democracy; and direct 
democracy. 
5) See also the Britannica internet source: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/157129/democracy  
6) The full quote of the crucial passage of Lincoln’s speech is: “It is rather for us 
to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these 
honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the 
last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall 
not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of 
freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall 
not perish from the earth” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettysburg_address). See 
also Sodaro (2004, 168). 
7) “This is the notion that the people have the right to govern themselves” 
(Sodaro, 2004, p. 164). 
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liberties8; democratic values9; and economic democracy10. Furthermore, 
under the heading of “ten conditions for democracy”, Sodaro (2004, pp. 
207-220) discusses the following aspects: “state institutions”; “elites 
committed to democracy”; “a homogeneous society”; “national wealth”; 
“private enterprise”; “a middle class”; “support of the disadvantaged for 
democracy”; “citizen participation, civil society, and a democratic political 
culture”; “education and freedom of information”; and “a favorable 
international environment”. 
As the “three fundamental principles” and the “basic determinants of 
democracy”, Bühlmann (et al., 2008) identify the following key concepts: 
equality; freedom; and “control”. They summarize: “… we define freedom, 
equality and control as the three core principles of democracy. To qualify as 
a democracy, a given political system hast to guarantee freedom and 
equality. Moreover, it has to optimize the interdependence between these 
two principles by means of control. Control is understood as control by the 
government as well as control of the government” (Bühlmann et al., 2008, 
p. 15). On freedom, the (United States-based) Freedom House organization 
underscores in its mission statement: “Freedom is possible only in 
democratic political systems in which the governments are accountable to 
their own people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, 
association, and belief, as well as respect for their rights of minorities and 
woman, are guaranteed.”11 In this context we may raise the question, 
whether North American scholars are more inclined to emphasize the 
criterion of freedom, and Western European scholars more the criterion of 
equality? Public opinion surveys for Western Europe indicate that 
individuals with a more-left political orientation prefer equality, and 
individuals with a more-right (conservative) political orientation have 
preferences for freedom (Harding et al., 1986, p. 87). 
                                     
8) “It consists of certain basic rights and freedoms that must be guaranteed by law 
to the citizenry” (Sodaro, 2004, p. 164). 
9) “Tolerance, fairness, and compromise are among the most important of these 
values” (Sodaro, 2004. p. 164). 
10) “It establishes various criteria of fairness or equality as social and economic 
components of democracy” (Sodaro, 2004, p. 164). 
11) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2  
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2. The empirical spreading of democracy in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries: The need for distinguishing between different qualities 
of democracy 
Currently (as of 2008) only three governments in the world do not self-
identify themselves in their official de jure understanding as democracies.12 
During the second half of the twentieth century there has been a substantial 
empirical spreading of democracies, i.e. of democratic forms of government 
(in country-based democracies). In empirical terms, this clearly is being 
reflected by the Freedom in the World country rating scores, beginning 
1972, as they are released by Freedom House. In 1972, only a minority of 
countries was rated as free. However, since then the number of free 
countries rose steadily, and since the 1990s there are more free than either 
partly free or not free countries (Freedom House, 2008a). According to a 
Freedom House survey, in mid-1992 about 24.8% of the world population 
lived in “free” countries. Until mid-2007, this figure increased to 45.9%.13 
As is being revealed by the data set of the Polity IV organization, the 
number of democracies increased considerably during the later years of the 
1980s, and after 1990 there are clearly more democracies than “anocracies” 
(semi-authoritarian regimes) and “autocracies” (authoritarian regimes).14 
The collapse of non-democratic communist regimes in Central Eastern and 
Eastern Europe critically marked a crucial watershed for the advancement 
of democracies. Thus the hypothesis can be set up for discussion that 
democracy, after 1990, represents the dominant global regime type. The 
famous The End of History notion of Francis Fukuyama claims that in the 
world of ideas there exist no more real alternatives or challenges to the 
concept of “liberal democracy”. In that understanding democracy (liberal 
democracy) finally prevailed ideationally. A key quote of Fukuyama (1989, 
p. 3) is: “The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a 
paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the 
remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an 
updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of 
                                     
12) See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Democracy_claims_2.PNG  
13) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=130&year=2008  
14) See: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/global2.htm  
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nuclear war. … The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident 
first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to 
Western liberalism.”15 
With reference to the spreading of democracies, Samuel P. Huntington 
(1991; 1997) speaks of three historical long waves of democracy. The first 
wave started in the first half of the nineteenth century, for example with the 
passing of the right to vote to the male population (male franchise) in the 
United States. This wave peaked in the 1920s, saw then a certain retreat in 
the inter-war period (1918-1939), with the collapse of some of the newly 
born European democracies. The second wave was launched after World 
War II and lasted until the 1960s, respectively the early 1970s. In the mid-
1970s, finally, the third wave of democracy rose, extending to the 
democratization of countries in Latin America and in post-Communist 
Europe.16 In current academic literature also the term of the “fourth wave of 
democracy” already is being used, addressing, for example, transition 
problems to democracy in post-communist countries (McFaul, 2002).  
This empirical spreading of democracies during the second half of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century implicates 
two consequences. On the one hand, it can be claimed that, in principle, 
democracy represents the dominant form of government and governance 
(the dominant regime type). On the other hand, now it becomes more 
important to seek possibilities for distinguishing between different qualities 
of democracy, for the purpose of mutually learning from democracies, 
innovating democracies, and developing democracies further. During the 
post-1945 period of the Cold War, where the global system was to a large 
extent polarized by the competition of western democracies versus the 
totalitarian/authoritarian communist regimes, it appeared somewhat 
sufficient to apply in a simple dichotomized fashion the code “democratic” 
and “non-democratic”. Nowadays, there is more preference for the 
                                     
15) See also Fukuyama (1992). 
16) For further academic review and use of the concept of waves-of-democracy 
see Markoff (1996). On the concept of democratization see also Whitehead 
(1998). 
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understanding of a continuum between the two (ideal typical) poles of 
democratic and non-democratic: this implies that there can exist very 
different forms of semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian regimes 
(Campbell et al., 1996, p. 517; Sodaro, 2004, pp. 32-3318). The spreading 
(expansion) of democracy feeds conceptually and empirically a certain need 
for differentiating between low-quality, medium-quality and high-quality 
democracy. What are the crucial elements and procedures that make and 
advance a high-quality democracy? With the further evolvement and 
evolution of democracies: Into which directions will new concepts of and 
demands on the quality of democracy move? In that context Jorge Vargas 
Cullell (2004, p. 116) cites the metaphor that an observed quality of 
democracy most probably will lie below the threshold of a high quality 
democracy. 
The end of history notion of Fukuyama (ruling out the existence of viable 
conceptual alternatives to a western-style liberal democracy) attracts a 
certain plausibility. However, when we expect (at least potentially) a further 
development and advancement of democracies, why should this not impose 
effects on our concepts of democracy?19 In his well known article, 
Fukuyama (1989) speaks of equality and inequality, and on page 9 also of 
“moral qualities”, but does not use the concept of the “quality of 
democracy”, as is being quickly revealed by a word count. In addition, we 
should assume that democracies will permanently be confronted by new 
(and old) problems that require alterations and permanent adaptation 
processes of problem-solving policies, yearning for “democratic 
innovation” (Saward, 2000). Liberal democracy certainly shows strengths 
with regard to the fundamental principle of freedom. But (western-style) 
liberal democracy also shows (substantial) weaknesses concerning the 
fundamental principle of equality. Constraints of equality refer to issues 
such as: gender democracy (e.g., see Pantelidou-Malouta, 2006), economic 
                                     
17) See, furthermore: Campbell and Schaller, 2002. 
18) “Viewed in these terms, the relationship between democracy and 
authoritarianism should be seen as a continuum, with intermediate gradations 
between the extremes” (Sodaro, 2004, p. 32). 
19) We should note that also Fukuyama placed a question mark to the end of 
history article title in The National Interest of 1989. 
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and socio-economic sustainability, and environmental responsibility. 
Normally, democracy is being seen in context of countries or nation-states. 
This concept of a country-based democracy certainly is challenged by ideas 
about supranational or transnational, even global democracy in the sense of 
“democratizing globalization” (Campbell, 1994; Held et al., 1999, pp. 444-
452). The European Union experiences forms of “multi-level governance” 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001), and it appears rational to apply this framework 
to other political structures. Furthermore, future advances in knowledge, 
such as scientific breakthroughs and innovations based on next generation 
technologies, may crucially alter and transform society, the economy, and 
thus also democracy. Concepts of the knowledge-based society and 
economy clearly underscore the importance of knowledge and knowledge 
advances (Carayannis and Campbell, 2006a).  
3. Initiatives for an empirical measurement of democracies in global 
context: Freedom House, Polity IV, Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy, 
and Democracy Index 
Several initiatives have been established that are interested in measuring 
democracies empirically around the world. In the following, four of these 
initiatives are being portrayed in more detail, highlighting their conceptual 
and methodic approaches: 
1. Freedom House:20 In 1941, Freedom House was established in the 
United States21 as a “nonprofit, nonpartisan organization”, interested 
in “combining analysis, advocacy and action”. In its mission 
statement, Freedom House stresses: “Freedom House is an 
independent nongovernmental organization that supports the 
expansion of freedom in the world”.22 Freedom House opposes 
“dictatorships of the far left and the far right”. Freedom House 
                                     
20) The general website address of Freedom House is: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org  
21) Two important founding members of Freedom House were Eleanor Roosevelt 
and Wendell Willkie. 
22) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2  
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publishes every year a Freedom in the World report, for example the 
Map of Freedom 2008, which covers worldwide all independent 
countries and also the related and disputed territories (Freedom House, 
2008b).23 In its methodology chapter (Freedom House, 2008c)24, 
Freedom House explains the conceptual basis and the methodic 
procedures for those annual global freedom surveys.25 Conceptually, 
freedom is being based on the two dimensions (axes) of political 
rights and civil liberties, which Freedom House (2008c, p. 6) calls 
“political rights and civil liberties checklists”. The political rights 
checklist is made up of the following sub-categories: “Electoral 
Process”; “Political Pluralism and Participation”; “Functioning of 
Government”; “Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions”. 
The civil liberties checklist consists of the sub-categories: “Freedom 
of Expression and Belief”; “Associational and Organizational Rights”; 
“Rule of Law”; “Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights”. Every 
sub-category again is clustered into different sub-questions. In context 
of a peer review process26, experts (analysts) assign for every covered 
country a certain number of raw points to each sub-category: “Raw 
points are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, 
where 0 points represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree 
of rights or liberties present” (Freedom House, 2008c, p. 5). The 
maximum possible score for raw points for a country for the political 
rights are 40, and for the civil liberties 60. The raw points are 
converted into a 1-7 point rating scale, and the combined average of 
these two ratings determines the final “country status”, which is in 
numerical terms (Freedom House, 2008c, pp. 23-24): 1.0 to 2.5 = free; 
3.0 to 5.0 = partly free; 5.5 to 7.0 = not free. Since 1972, Freedom 
House (2008a) publishes the status (free, partly free, and not free) of 
                                     
23) The 2008 survey “… covers developments from January 1, 2007, through 
December 31, 2007, in 193 countries and 15 territories” (Freedom House, 2008c, 
p. 3). See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008  
24) See: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=20
08  
25) See also: Gastil (1993). 
26) Concerning methodical strengths and weaknesses of peer review and/or 
indicators, see the debate in: Campbell, 2003, pp. 106-110. 
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all covered countries in a world-wide comparative format. As of 2003, 
Freedom House also releases the aggregate scores (based on the raw 
points); and as of 2006, Freedom House additionally publishes sub-
category scores (Freedom House, 2008d).27 Who are the peers, who 
carry out the country rating for Freedom House? For example, 
Freedom House documents publicly on its website the members of the 
“survey team” that were responsible for the Freedom in the World 
report for 2008.28 The team consisted of 35 contributing authors and 
16 academic advisors (Freedom House, 2008e). In the methodology 
chapter, Freedom House (2008c, p. 3) states: “The research and rating 
process involved 33 analysts and 16 senior-level academic advisers… 
The country and territory ratings were proposed by the analysts 
responsible for each related report.” In addition to the Freedom in the 
World reports29, Freedom House publishes annually a Freedom of the 
Press survey (Freedom House, 2008f).30  
2. Polity IV:31 Polity IV follows the “Polity research tradition” (Polity 
IV, 2008a, p. 1) that was established by the founder Ted Robert Gurr 
from the University of Maryland. Polity IV is being managed by the 
Center for Systematic Peace32, together with the Center for Global 
Policy, and as current director of Polity IV acts Monty G. Marshall 
from George Mason University. The Polity IV project refers to 
“political regime characteristics and transitions” (Polity IV, 2008a). 
The database of Polity IV covers all “major, independent states in the 
global system (i.e., states with total population of 500,000 or more in 
the most recent year; currently 162 countries)” for the period 1800-
2006. In conceptual terms, the key research question of the Polity IV 
                                     
27) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=276  
28) See: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=343&year=20
08  
29) See on Wikipedia also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_in_the_World  
30) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16  
31) The general website address of Polity IV is: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
32) See: http://www.systematicpeace.org  
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project focuses on “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic 
authority in governing institutions”. Three major regime types or 
types of “governing authority” are being proposed: “fully 
institutionalized autocracies”; “mixed, or incoherent, authority 
regimes”, which are also called “anocracies”; and “fully 
institutionalized democracies”. To reflect these regime types a 21-
point scale or “Polity Score” was designed that applies a score range 
from -10 (“hereditary monarchy”) to +10 (“consolidated democracy”). 
The Polity Score can also be transformed into a three-fold regime type 
categorization: “autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5) and 
“democracies” (+6 to +10).33 The polity scheme consists of six 
“component measures” that refer to “key qualities” of “executive 
recruitment”, “constraints on executive authority” and “political 
competition” (Polity IV, 2008a, pp. 2-3). In the Polity IV Country 
Reports 2006, these three concepts are expressed as “executive 
recruitment”, “executive constraints” and “political participation” 
(Polity IV, 2008c). For example, the 2006 rating for the United States 
reveals “competitive elections”, “executive parity or subordination”, 
and “institutionalized open electoral competition”; for China the 
rating concludes “designation”, “slight to moderate limitations”, and 
“repressed competition”. The whole data base of Polity IV, covering 
all independent countries with a population of 500,000 or more during 
the period 1800-2006, can be downloaded for free (Polity IV, 
2008d).34 
3. Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy:35 The Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democracy was designed and developed by Tatu Vanhanen, now 
professor emeritus at the University of Tampere and the University of 
Helsinki. The index base are the key “dimensions” of “competition” 
and “participation”, which Vanhanen (2000a, pp. 188, 191) also 
                                     
33) For a global evolution of these regime types during the period 1946-2006, see 
Polity IV (2008b). 
34) For a further reading on concepts and methods of Polity IV see Ted Robert 
Gurr et al. (1993). 
35) The general website address of the Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy is: 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy  
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addresses as the “two basic indicators of democratization 
(Competition and Participation”. As competition Vanhanen (2000a, p. 
186) defines “… the percentage share of the smaller parties and 
independents of the votes cast in parliamentary elections, or of the 
seats in parliament”, where the “… smaller parties’ share was 
calculated by subtracting the largest party’s share from 100 per cent”. 
Participation is for Vanhanen (2000a, p. 186) “… the percentage of 
the adult population that voted in elections”. To qualify as a 
democracy, Vanhanen (2000a, p. 193) argues for minimum thresholds 
of at least 30% for competition and of at least 10% for participation. 
Vanhanen leverages on competition and participation for calculating 
an aggregated Index of Democratization: “Because both dimensions of 
democratization are necessary for democracy, I have weighted them 
equally in my Index of Democratization (ID)” (Vanhanen, 2000a, p. 
191; see also Pickel and Pickel, 2006a, pp. 194-199).36 In cooperation 
with the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Oslo, 
Norway, Vanhanen posted to the internet his “Polyarchy dataset” that 
covers 187 countries for the period 1810-2000 (Vanhanen, 2008a; 
2008b). Vanhanen stresses the similarity of his two dimensions of 
competition and participation with the two concepts of “public 
contestation” and “participation” that were introduced by Robert A. 
Dahl (1971, p. 7). 
4. Democracy Index:37 Recently the Economist (Economist.com) 
launched an initiative for designing and setting up a democracy index 
(The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, 2008). The 
democracy index refers directly to Freedom House and Freedom 
House’s concepts of political rights and civil liberties. The democracy 
index claims that freedom should not be treated as a synonym for 
democracy: “Although the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are often 
                                     
36) For a further reading see: Vanhanen 2000b and Vanhanen 2003. 
37) The general website address of the Democracy Index is: 
http://www.economist.com/markets/rankings/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8908438
. See also: 
http://www.economist.com/theworldin/international/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8
166790&d=2007  
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used interchangeably, the two are not synonymous” (Kekic, 2007, p. 
1). The democracy index is interested in applying a broader concept of 
democracy: “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index is based on the 
view that measures of democracy that reflect the state of political 
freedoms and civil liberties are not thick enough. They do not 
encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how 
substantive democracy is or its quality. Freedom is an essential 
component of democracy, but not sufficient” (Kekic, 2007, p. 2). In 
conceptual terms, the democracy index applies the following five 
“categories”: “electoral process and pluralism”; “civil liberties”; “the 
functioning of government”; “political participation”; and “political 
culture”. Every country is being rated for each of those categories, and 
finally also an overall score is calculated. The Democracy Index 2006 
compares 165 independent states and 2 territories. Based on the 
aggregated overall scores, the democracy index distinguishes between 
the following regime types: “full democracies” (overall scores from 8 
to 10), “flawed democracies” (6 to 7.9), “hybrid regimes” (4 to 5.9), 
and “authoritarian regimes” (less than 4). In 2006, Sweden ranked 
first (scoring at 9.88), and North Korea ranked last (with a score of 
1.03). Referring to the whole world population and the year 2006, 
13% lived in full democracies38, and 38.2% in authoritarian regimes 
(Kekic, 2007).39 
The relationship between freedom and democracy obviously is complex. 
We interpret freedom as a crucial and necessary dimension of democracy. 
Thus, without freedom, a democracy cannot exist. This, however, does not 
automatically determine in conceptual terms, whether or not there is a need 
for dimensions in addition to freedom for qualifying a country or a political 
system as democratic. In several theoretical and/or conceptual 
understandings of democracy, freedom alone would be insufficient. Often 
equality also is being regarded as a crucial additional dimension for 
democracy (see again Bühlmann et al., 2008, pp. 8-9). Based on the key 
                                     
38) Full democracies and flawed democracies combined amount to 51.3%. 
39) See also on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_index  
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word “list of indices of freedom”, Wikipedia40 retrieves the following 
initiatives and organizations: Freedom in the World (Freedom House), 
Index of Economic Freedom (Wall Street Journal and Heritage 
Foundation)41, Worldwide Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without 
Borders)42, Economic Freedom of the World Index (Fraser Institute)43, and 
the Index of Democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit). Concerning 
Freedom House and the Democracy Index, this list of freedom indices 
cross-cuts with the above discussed initiatives that focus on measuring 
democracies in a global context. Sodaro (2004, p. 33) offers a scheme, how 
the freedom ratings of Freedom House may be transferred on a 
“democracy-authoritarianism continuum” into the categories “democratic”, 
“semi-democratic”, “semi-authoritarian”, and “authoritarian”. 
From the academic side already several attempts have been undertaken to 
evaluate comparatively the quality of different democracy measurement 
indices (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Müller and Pickel, 2007; see also 
Inkeles, 1993).44 The Vanhanen Index of Democracy uses objective (or 
quasi-objective) data, however, could be criticized for applying 
“questionable indicators” (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, p. 28). When the 
Vanhanen Index is being compared with Freedom House and Polity IV, it 
appears that Vanhanen’s Index is more permissive in allowing a country to 
be characterized as being democratic (Vanhanen, 2000, p. 195). The annual 
freedom reports of Freedom House are based on peer review processes. 
This implies the problem that freedom ranking results may be determined 
by the membership composition of the peer panels, raising issues such as 
“subjective measures of liberal democracies” (see Bollen, 1993a; Bollen 
and Paxton, 2000). Furthermore, criticism has been articulated that the 
freedom reports of Freedom House correlate too closely with foreign policy 
positions of the United States and thus might be biased one-sidedly in favor 
                                     
40) See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indices_of_Freedom  
41) See: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index  
42) See: http://www.rsf.org  
43) See: http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html  
44) Furthermore see: Lauth et al., 2000; Lauth, 2004; Pickel and Pickel, 2006b. 
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of a U.S. perception of the world.45 In methodic terms, also the 7-point 
rating scale of Freedom House could be questioned for not distinguishing 
sensitively enough. For example, since 1972, the United States received 
every year for the political rights as well as the civil liberties always (and 
only) the top rating score of “1” (Freedom House, 2008a).46 Perhaps in 
(partial) reaction to this, Freedom House (2008d) recently decided to 
release the sub-category and aggregate scores of the last few years that 
deliver more differentiating ranking results. At the same time, however, 
also the strengths of the Freedom House freedom rankings should be 
underscored. So far, no other source exists that annually and reliably 
publishes freedom rankings for more than three (now almost four) decades. 
Freedom House also is being frequently cited by other scholarly work.47 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy engaged in 
democracy measurement, based on the claim of developing a democracy 
index that is broader (“thicker”) than Freedom House. The Economist’s 
democracy index is not fully publicly accessible, but tied to a subscription 
of the Economist, thus complicating an open review of this initiative.48 One 
option to access the Economist’s democracy index document of Kekic 
(2007) is to move through the Wikipedia website.49 In their conclusion on 
different democracy measurement indices, Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 
29) emphasize that “… there remains much room for improving the quality 
of data on democracy”. Finally it should be mentioned that there exist also 
democracy initiatives in addition to Freedom House, Polity IV, Vanhanen, 
                                     
45) See on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House  
46) As a conceptual consequence of the applied model design, the U.S. also 
always received (receives), since 1946, in the Polity IV project a top score (Polity 
IV, 2008c). This effect additionally refers to some of the other developed 
countries, covered by Polity IV. 
47) See on Google Scholar: 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=%22freedom+in+the+world%22+%22freedo
m+house%22&hl=en&lr=&start=10&sa=N  
48) See again: 
http://www.economist.com/markets/rankings/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8908438  
49) The Wikipedia entry on the Democracy Index of the Economist states: “Most 
answers are ‘experts’ assessments’; the report does not indicate what kinds of 
experts, nor their number, nor whether the experts are employees of The 
Economist or e.g. independent scholars, nor the nationalities of the experts”. See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index  
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and the Economist. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (International IDEA) focuses on providing “knowledge to 
democracy builders”, “policy development and analysis” and support for a 
“democratic reform” (see also Beetham, 1993, and Beetham et al., 2002).50 
Bühlmann et al. (2008, p. 2) report on designing a Democracy Barometer 
for Established Democracies that “… tries to fill a gap in the measurement 
of democracy”. 
4. Minimum or maximum definitions of democracy? Short review of 
concepts of the quality of democracy 
According to Freedom House (2008c, pp. 9-10), to qualify as an “electoral 
democracy”, a country must meet “certain minimum standards”. Freedom 
House lists the following four criteria: (1) “A competitive, multiparty 
political system”; (2) “Universal adult suffrage for all citizens”; (3) 
“Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, 
reasonable ballot secrecy, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and 
that yield results that are representative of the public will”; (4) and 
“Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through 
the media and through generally open political campaigning”. Based on the 
conceptual and methodic framework of Freedom House, every liberal 
democracy also is an electoral democracy, but not every electoral 
democracy qualifies as a liberal democracy. This means that a liberal 
democracy demands sufficient democracy standards, and not only 
minimum standards. Liberal democracy goes beyond the minimum 
standards of an electoral democracy. In such an understanding a liberal 
democracy already represents a higher manifestation form of democracy. In 
the own words of Freedom House (2008c, p. 10): “Freedom House’s term 
‘electoral democracy’ differs from ‘liberal democracy’ in that the latter also 
implies the presence of a substantial array of civil liberties. In the survey, 
all Free countries qualify as both electoral and liberal democracies. By 
contrast, some Partly Free countries qualify as electoral, but not liberal, 
democracies”. The Freedom in the World survey 2008 by Freedom House 
                                     
50) The general website address of IDEA is: http://www.idea.int  
 19
indicates all together 121 electoral democracies in 200751; by contrast, in 
the same year 2007, there were only 90 free countries52, i.e. liberal 
democracies (Freedom House, 2008g). Freedom House’s Map of Freedom 
200853 visualizes the global distribution of free, partly free and not free 
countries around mid-2007.54 Several scholars paraphrase western 
democracies typically as manifestations of liberal democracy.55 Here, again, 
Fukuyama (1989, p. 4) could be quoted prominently, when he claims: “… 
but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.” Fukuyama’s conceptual paradigm 
reinforces the conceptual framework of Freedom House. Other scholars are 
more inclined to distinguish between different types of western 
democracies, offering typologies for a patterning. Arend Lijphart (1984, pp. 
1-36) focuses on comparing majoritarian (the so-called Westminster Model 
of Democracy) and consensus (Consensus Model of Democracy) types of 
governments. Michael Sodaro (2004, p. 48) clusters western democracies 
based on the degree of development of their social welfare systems: “The 
United States usually leans toward liberal democracy (though it also 
provides numerous social welfare benefits), whereas most West European 
countries typically lean toward social democracy (though they also provide 
basic political and economic liberties)”. Laza Kekic from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy asserts that the criteria of Freedom 
House for a liberal democracy are not substantially different from the 
                                     
51) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/Chart120File165.pdf  
52) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/Chart116File163.pdf  
53) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008  
54) For a visual presentation of electoral democracies in mid-2007, according to 
Freedom House data, see on Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Freedom_House_electoral_democracies_2008.
gif  
55) Wikipedia suggests the following definition for a liberal democracy: “A 
Liberal democracy is a representative democracy in which the ability of the 
elected representatives to exercise decision-making power is subject to the rule of 
law, and usually moderated by a constitution that emphasizes the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of individuals, and which places constraints on the leaders 
and on the extent to which the will of the majority can be exercised against the 
rights of minorities”. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy  
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criteria for an electoral democracy: “The Freedom House definition of 
political freedom is somewhat (though not much) more demanding than its 
criteria for electoral democracy” (Kekic, 2008, p. 1).56  
How narrowly or how broadly should a democracy be (theoretically) 
conceptualized? There exists a variety of minimum versus maximum 
definitions of democracy. Bühlmann et al. (2008, p. 5) introduce a three-
fold typology: minimalist would be “elitist”, focusing on a “government of 
the people” and an “effective governance”; medium would be 
“participatory”, underscoring the “government of and by the people” and an 
“intense and qualitative participation and representation”; and maximalist 
stresses the “social”, a “government of, by, and for the people” and the 
characteristics of “best representation/high participation, social justice”.57 
Kekic uses in this context the terms of “thin” and “thick” concepts of 
democracy, but refers to Michael Coppedge as original author on that 
wording: “A key difference in the various measures of democracy is 
between ‘thin’ or minimalist ones and ‘thick’ or wider concepts (Coppedge, 
2005)” (Kekic, 2007, p. 1).58 Sodaro (2004, pp. 168, 180, 182) offers 
different minimum and maximum examples for democracy: “representative 
democracy” versus “direct democracy” on a “continuum of popular 
sovereignty”; “laissez-faire” versus “councils and participatory democracy” 
on a “continuum of economic decision-making regimes”; and “non-
discrimination” versus “affirmative action” in context of “democratic 
values”. Minimum and/or maximum definitions of democracy also could be 
re-worded as focused (more narrow) and/or comprehensive (wider) 
concepts (theories) of democracy. In that understanding, a focused 
democracy concept defines democracy as a characteristic (property) of the 
political system; whereas a comprehensive democracy concept refers also to 
                                     
56) In Chapter 3, we already referred to the circumstance that the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy cannot be accessed on the internet 
without subscribing the Economist. 
57) Metaphorically, here, the “Gettysburg Address” of Abraham Lincoln is being 
iterated. 
58) Kekic cites, of Michael Coppedge (2005), his working paper “Defining and 
Measuring Democracy” that was presented at the International Political Science 
Association. 
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society (and the economy, perhaps even the environment) and is interested 
in contextualizing the political system within the context of society. This 
focused/political and/or comprehensive/societal continuum could be linked 
furthermore to a multi-level architecture (local, national, global) of political 
and non-political structures (see Figure 1 for a graphical visualization). An 
electoral democracy (minimum standards) is more narrowly set up than a 
liberal democracy (sufficient standards). Referring back to the four 
initiatives of empirical democracy measurement that we discussed in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 3), we could propose the following sequencing 
based on a “thiner” or broader conceptualization of democracy: (1) the 
Vanhanen Index of democracy represents a thin concept that looks at 
electoral competition and participation, where we may even question 
whether or not the minimum criteria for democracy are being fulfilled; (2) 
Polity IV already is broader, and Polity IV introduces a more 
comprehensive perspective of political institutions; (3) the freedom concept 
of Freedom House is broader than Polity IV, since it includes a functioning 
government and several civil liberties to its checklist of criteria; (4) and the 
Economist’s Democracy Index perhaps is broader than Freedom House, 
because the Democracy Index integrates also political culture as a 
benchmark.  
The Human Development Index (HDI), on the contrary, which is being 
published for all countries in the world in the annually released Human 
Development Reports, combines and integrates a life expectancy index (life 
expectancy in years), an education index (adult literacy and “combined 
primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment”), and a GPD index 
(“adjusted GDP59 per capita”, PPP60 US$) (see, for example, United 
Nations Development Programme, 2007, pp. 229-233, 355-361). Thus the 
Human Development Index qualifies as a broad concept that monitors 
developments of society and the economy. But looked at in isolation, it 
could be questioned, whether the HDI really measures democracy and 
therefore has the capability for representing a serious measure for 
democracy. However, as will be demonstrated later, contextualized in a 
                                     
59) GDP: gross domestic product.  
60) PPP: purchasing power parity.  
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broader theoretical framework of analysis also the HDI could be leveraged 
for assessing the qualities of democracies (see O’Donnell, 2004a; more 
particularly 2004b, pp. 11-12).61 
Figure 1: Minimum or maximum definitions
of democracy?
Multi-level
architecture
Transnational:
global
Democracy
focused comprehensive Transnational:
supranational
Politics / Society National /
political system nation-state
Subnational:
regional
Subnational:
local
Source: Author's own conceptualization.
 
In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs (195762/1985, pp. 
23-24) establishes eight criteria that define the “nature of democratic 
                                     
61) For the general website address of the Human Development Reports see: 
http://hdr.undp.org/xmlsearch/reportSearch?y=*&c=*&t=*&k=&orderby=year  
62) This book was first published and released in 1957. 
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government”. Three of these are: (1) “The losing parties in an election 
never try by force or any illegal means to prevent the winning party (or 
parties) from taking office”; (2) “The party in power never attempts to 
restrict the political activities of any citizens or other parties as long as they 
make no attempt to overthrow the government by force”; and (3) “There are 
two or more parties competing for control of the governing apparatus in 
every election”. In his influential book Polyarchy, Robert A. Dahl (1971, 
pp. 2-9) suggests that democracy and democratization consist of two 
(theoretical) dimensions: (1) contestation (“public contestation”, “political 
competition”)63 and (2) participation (“participation”, “inclusiveness”, 
“right to participate in elections and office”). These dimensions are 
contextualized by “eight institutional guarantees” (Dahl, 1971, p. 3). As a 
polyarchy, Dahl (1971, pp. 8) defines: “Polyarchies, then, may be thought 
of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or, to put it in 
another way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially 
popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to 
public contestation”.64 Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 9) emphasize that 
“Dahl’s … influential insight that democracy consists of two 
attributes―contestation or competition and participation or inclusion―has 
done much to ensure that these measures of democracy are squarely 
focused on theoretically relevant attributes.”65 It would be interesting to 
analyze, whether or not the presented concepts of Downs and Dahl lean 
more in favor of an electoral and/or liberal democracy. In case of the 
Downsian model the hypothesis could be set up that his conceptual 
framework focuses more on attributes that associate closer to an electoral 
                                     
63) “Throughout this book the terms liberalization, political competition, 
competitive politics, public contestation, and public opposition are used 
interchangeably to refer to this dimension, and regimes relatively high on this 
dimension are frequently referred to as competitive regimes” (Dahl, 1971, p. 4). 
64) On Wikipedia, polyarchy is being defined as: “In modern political science, the 
term Polyarchy (Greek: poly many, arkhe rule)[1] was introduced by Robert A. 
Dahl, now emeritus professor at Yale University, to describe a form of 
government in which power is vested in three or more persons.” See: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyarchy  
65) See also Bollen (1993b, pp. 5-10).  
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democracy.66 Dahl’s model is perhaps somewhat broader (when we look at 
the political dimensions). The Dahl model could be interpreted in both 
ways, because Dahl’s understanding of polyarchies bridges electoral as well 
as liberal democracies.67 
In a recent review of approaches on the quality of democracy and “good 
governance”, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2004) emphasize that 
this would imply freedom, equality and control, and offer a three-fold 
quality structure: “quality of results”68, “quality of content”69, and 
“procedural quality”70. Diamond and Morlino (2004, p. 22) state: “The 
multidimensional nature of our framework, and of the growing number of 
democracy assessments that are being conducted, implies a pluralist notion 
of democratic quality.” Diamond and Morlino (2004, pp. 22-23) stress 
“eight dimensions of democratic quality”: (1) rule of law (O’Donnell, 
2004a); (2) participation; (3) competition; (4) vertical accountability 
(Schmitter, 2004); (5) horizontal accountability; (6) freedom (Beetham, 
2004); (7) equality; and (8) responsiveness. The first five dimensions (1-5), 
Diamond and Morlino (2004, p. 23) qualify as “procedural dimensions”.71 
It is obvious that this multidimensional framework goes beyond the 
minimum standards of an electoral democracy and matches easily the 
necessary demands for a liberal democracy. These dimensions identify 
high-quality standards for advanced democracies, pinpointing challenges 
                                     
66) Bollen (1993b, p. 7) concludes on Anthony Downs: “Downs … states that a 
democracy must have periodic elections decided by majority with a one-person 
one-vote, standard.” 
67) Interestingly, Dahl does not cite the earlier work of Downs, as is being 
documented by the index in Dahl’s book (1971, pp. 251-257). Downs (1957/1985, 
p. 302), on the contrary, refers to Dahl. 
68) Such “… a regime will satisfy citizen expectations regarding governance” 
(Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 22). 
69) “… it will allow citizens, associations, and communities to enjoy extensive 
liberty and political equality” (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 22). 
70) “… and it will provide a context in which the whole citizenry can judge the 
government’s performance through mechanisms such as elections, while 
governmental institutions and officials hold one another legally and 
constitutionally accountable as well” (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 22). 
71) See also Diamond and Morlino (2005). 
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for contemporary western liberal democracies and the whole further future 
evolution of democracies in global context. Does a high-quality democracy 
develop substantially beyond the thresholds of a liberal democracy? Robert 
Dahl indicated the two dimensions of participation and contestation 
(competition) as key for the dynamics of democracies (democratic 
polyarchies). Diamond and Morlino emphasize eight relevant dimensions. 
This means that the two-fold dimensional democracy structure of Dahl is 
being extended to an eight-fold dimensional structure. The extension 
illustrates the conceptual shift from (low-level quality) electoral democracy 
to (medium-level and high-level quality) liberal democracy, also supporting 
the notion that the quality of democracy is conceptually more 
comprehensive (broader) than the (thinner) conceptual formulas for 
electoral or early-stage liberal democracies (see Figure 2).72 
 
 
 
                                     
72) Compare also the Figures 1 and 2. 
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Figure 2: Dimensions for the measurement
and/or improvement of the quality of democracy.
The rule of law
Participation Participation
Contestation Competition
(competition)
Source: Robert Dahl (1971). Vertical accountability
Polyarchy. New Haven,
CT: Yale University
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Freedom
Equality
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Results
(quality of
results)
Content Procedure
(quality of (quality of
content) procedure)
Source: Diamond & Morline (2004). The Quality of Democracy. An Overview.
Journal of Democracy, 15 (4), 20-31.
Source for visual arrangement of Figure 2: Author's own conceptualization.
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Guillermo O’Donnell (2004b, p. 13) conceptualizes the “human being as an 
agent”, endowed with three attributes: an autonomy for decisions-making; a 
cognitive ability for reasoning; and a responsibility for actions. According 
to O’Donnell, the concepts of democracy and of the quality of democracy 
are being based on the two principles of human development and human 
rights.73 O’Donnell (2004b, pp. 12-13, 42, 47) offers the following 
conceptual specifications: (1) “human development”74 focuses on the basic 
conditions or capabilities that enable individuals to act (behave) as agents. 
The human development clearly addresses the social and economic 
contexts. Concerning his understanding of human development, O’Donnell 
(2004b, pp. 11-12)75 draws interestingly a direct line of reference to the 
Human Development Reports of the UNDP, and to their underlying concept 
of the applied Human Development Index (see again United Nations 
Development Programme, 2007). This gives reasoning why even a measure 
for social and economic development (such as the Human Development 
Index) could be of a crucial value for measuring the quality of a democracy 
and supplies, furthermore, justification for broader concepts of democracy. 
(2) Conventionally, “human rights” are being clustered in political rights, 
civil rights and social rights.76 A legal system is crucial for balancing the 
state and for constraining possible state violence. The “social dimension” is 
being interpreted as “necessary milieus” that allow a transformation of 
                                     
73) “The concepts of human development and human rights share an underlying, 
universalistic vision of the human being as an agent” (O’Donnell, 2004b, p. 13). 
74) “… what may be, at least, a minimum set of conditions, or capabilities, that 
enable human beings to function in ways appropriate to their condition as such 
beings. …This vision leads to the question of what may be the basic conditions 
that normally enable an individual to function as an agent” (O’Donnell, 2004b, 
pp. 12-13). 
75) “The concept of human development that has been proposed and widely 
diffused by UNDP’s Reports and the work of Amartya Sen was a reversal of 
prevailing views about development. Instead of focusing on aggregate measures 
of economic performance or utility, human development as conceived by UNDP 
and Sen begins and ends with human beings. The concept asks how every 
individual is doing in relation to the achievement of ‘the most elementary 
capabilities, such as living a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and 
enjoying a decent standard of living’ (UNDP 2000a: 20)” (O’Donnell, 2004b, pp. 
11-12). See in our reference list: United Nations Development Programme, 2000.  
76) As original source for this typology of rights, O’Donnell (2004b, pp. 47, 88) 
cites the text “Citizenship and Social Class” by T. H. Marshall (1964). 
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(formal) rights into real “freedoms”.77 Consequently, without human 
development, the human rights are more rights and not so much freedoms. 
In this context, O’Donnell (2004b, p. 55) uses the metaphor of speaking of 
the three interacting currents of human rights, human development and 
democracy: “All the rights and capabilities associated with democracy, 
human rights, and human development directly pertain to, and enable, 
agency. This is the nexus of these three currents.” There operates also 
something like an “unbreakable vicious circle”: “basic human capabilities 
and human rights” clearly support the “effectuation of political rights”; at 
the same time, however, human rights have the potential of supporting the 
progress of human development (O’Donnell, 2004b, p. 61). Framed in a 
positively synergetic interaction loop, this should imply a “truly democratic 
rule of law”: “… a state that enacts a democratic rule of law, or an estado 
democrático de derecho” (O’Donnell, 2004a, pp. 32, 36). Furthermore, 
O’Donnell (2004b, pp. 37-43) elaborates which “social context” enhances 
the quality of a democracy. O’Donnell focuses on the following criteria: (1) 
free and pluralistic information;78 (2) a social context, reinforced by a legal 
system, based on a diversity of values, life styles, and opinions;79 (3) and a 
public sphere with a pluralism of debates and discourses.80 Put in summary, 
it is evident that O’Donnell’s concept of democracy and the quality of 
democracy is clearly more demanding than the simple vision of an electoral 
democracy (see Figure 3). 
 
                                     
77) “These are necessary milieus for the existence of these rights, which in their 
social expression I have called freedoms” (O’Donnell, 2004b, p. 42). 
78) “… the availability of free, pluralistic, and nonmonopolized or state-censored 
information is another necessary condition for the existence of a democratic 
regime” (O’Donnell, 2004b, p. 37). 
79) “… a social context that is congenial to the existence of a diversity of values, 
beliefs, lifestyles, and opinions. The other condition is―once again―a legal 
system that backs this diversity” (O’Donnell, 2004b, p. 38). 
80) “Furthermore, such a social context, populated by legally backed plural agents, 
offers the public good that authoritarian rulers most strive to suppress: the 
possible emergence of a public sphere of free and public discussions and 
deliberation about matters of general interest” (O’Donnell, 2004b, 39). 
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Figure 3: A conceptual visual summary of O'Donnell's 
analysis of the quality of democracy.
    Democracy
   Human    Human
   development    rights
        Agency
Source: Guillermo O'Donnell (2004). Human Development, Human Rights,
and Democracy, 9-92, in: Guillermo O'Donnell / Jorge Vargas Cullell /
Osvaldo M. Iazzetta (eds.): The Quality of Democracy. Theory and
Applications. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Source for visual arrangement of Figure 3: Author's own conceptualization.
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5. The basic concept for the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of 
Democracy  
Two key dimensions of democracy are freedom and equality, sometimes 
also being complemented, thirdly, by control (Bühlmann et al., 2008, p. 15; 
Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-9; Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 22). In the political 
language of ideology, values, policy, and political competition, the concepts 
of freedom and equality, however, often are loaded connotatively. We 
experience a tendency that freedom is being more endorsed by 
representatives of the political right or conservatism, and equality more by 
representatives of the political left (see again Harding et al., 1986, p. 87). A 
conceptualization of democracy and the quality of democracy, based on 
freedom, might favor the political right (conservatism); and a 
conceptualization based on equality might play to the advantage of the 
political left. Out of an interest to emphasize a left/right “trans-ideological” 
approach that is not caught up between and paralyzed by polarizing left 
versus right debates and cleavages, the Democracy Ranking adds to the 
picture the alternative dimension of performance, without neglecting the 
pivotal importance of freedom and equality. In that understanding “good 
governance” is not being primarily determined by left and/or right policy 
and value positions, but should be measured by performance. Non -political 
performance (in the non-political sectors), for example, could refer to the 
economy, health, knowledge, and the gender equality. High performance 
(also low performance) may be achieved with left and/or right policies. The 
Democracy Ranking emphasizes a responsibility of politics (democracy) for 
the society and also the environment. This does not automatically imply an 
interventionist or non-interventionist policy (for example, a social 
democratically based welfare regime versus laissez-faire capitalism), or a 
policy mix (e.g., variations of a market economy); what really counts, is 
performance, which (at least in principle) may be achieved with very 
different policy programs and value sets.81 Performance as a criterion has 
                                     
81) Sodaro (2004, p. 305) claims that most developed countries currently apply the 
one or other type of a mixed economy: “The most widely adopted economic 
system in the world today is neither laissez-faire capitalism nor full-scale 
socialism but something in between: the mixed economy. A mixed economy 
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the advantage of offering a theoretically “neutral” and balanced position 
“above” the political left and right axis (or liberal and conservative axis in 
the United States), thus treating the whole spectrum of political ideologies, 
values and policies fairer, also allowing and respecting political diversity 
that again is necessary for the viability of democracies and high-quality 
democracies (Campbell and Sükösd, 2002, p. 5; Campbell, 2004, pp. 9-11) 
(see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                    
combines both private enterprise and state involvement in the country’s economic 
affairs.” 
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Figure 4: Key dimensions for the measurement
of the quality of democracy.
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Source: Author's own conceptualization.
 
The UNDP’s Human Development Index measures reflect and mirror 
performance, and even so the concept of “human development” that 
represents, together with “human rights”, a basis for democracy in the 
thinking of O’Donnell (2004b). This performance emphasis of the 
Democracy Ranking earns additional credibility by a spreading general 
understanding on how important good governance is. The World Bank, for 
example, releases a regular series on Worldwide Governance Indicators 
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(see, for example, Kaufmann et al., 2008).82 Diamond and Morlino (2004, 
p. 22), furthermore, make the explicit case that governance relates directly 
to quality of democracy aspects, because in their conceptual framework 
about the quality of democracy the governance is linked to the “quality of 
results”. Factoring performance into the Democracy Ranking of the Quality 
of Democracy model obviously implies that then the status of socio-
economic development clearly impacts a quality-of-democracy ranking of 
countries. Thus a fair comparison of democracies could mean to look for 
“country peers” with comparable socio-economic conditions (of course 
acknowledging that this represents a non-trivial exercise). Despite the 
conviction that the Democracy Ranking treats performance as being 
left/right neutral and therefore behaves “trans-ideologically”, critics may 
assert that a focus on performance has a potential for introducing a new 
“ideology of performance”. 
In addition to this three-fold core structure of dimensions (freedom, 
equality and performance), the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of 
Democracy applies a further structure of dimensions, where the dimensions 
partially (but not always exactly) represent different “sectors” of society. 
These dimensions also could be interpreted as “sub-systems”, embedded by 
the encompassing general system of the whole society.83 These dimensions 
(sectors/sub-sectors, sub-systems of society) are (see Campbell and Sükösd, 
2002, pp. 5-684; Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2008a, p. 6): (1) politics 
(political system); (2) gender (gender equality); (3) economy (economic 
system); (4) knowledge (knowledge-based information society, research 
and education); (5) health (health status and health system); (6) 
environment (environmental sustainability). The Democracy Ranking 
assigns specific indicators per dimension, and the dimensions then are 
being aggregated to an overall ranking. For this dimensional aggregation, 
                                     
82) The general website address of the Worldwide Governance Indicators is: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
83) Society, furthermore, could be contextualized within the multi-level 
architecture of local, national and global structures (see Figure 1). 
84) In the Feasibility Study (Campbell and Sükösd, 2002), for the fist time, this 
specific structure of dimensions was introduced for the purpose of a quality-of-
democracy assessment and ranking. 
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concrete weight measures apply to the different dimensions, which are 
(Campbell and Sükösd, 2002, p. 6; Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2008a, p. 6): 
1. politics: 50%; 
2. gender: 10%; 
3. economy: 10%; 
4. knowledge: 10%; 
5. health: 10%; 
6. and the environment: 10%. 
This dimensional patterning and weighing underscores that the Democracy 
Ranking of the Quality of Democracy follows a broad (comprehensive) 
conceptual understanding of democracy. Referring to the two poles of 
“Quality of Democracy = Quality of Politics” and “Quality of Democracy = 
Quality of Society”, the Democracy Ranking focuses on a middle position 
in between: “Quality of Democracy = Quality of Politics + Quality of 
Society” (Campbell, 2004, pp. 12-15). Recalling again the four discussed 
democracy-measurement indices in Chapter 3, the Democracy Ranking is 
broader than the Vanhanen Index of democracy, Polity IV, Freedom House 
and even the Economist’s Democracy Index. The Democracy Ranking also 
is more comprehensive than the UNDP’s Human Development Index 
(HDI), because the Democracy Ranking covers the whole HDI spectrum 
(life expectancy, education and GDP), but the HDI, in contrast, does not 
fully include the political system. By weighting politics 50%, the 
Democracy Ranking emphasizes the prominent position of the political 
system for a democracy. Without acknowledging the political system, it 
does not appear appropriate to talk about democracy. However, the 
combined weight measures of the five non-political dimensions (of the 
Democracy Ranking) are equal to the political dimension, implying that in a 
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broader democracy understanding the political system also carries a 
responsibility for the other sectors of society (and for the environment). 
These weight measures are in line with the logic of Quality of Democracy = 
Quality of Politics + Quality of Society. Without reflecting on the quality of 
society, there cannot be a sufficient comprehension of the context for the 
quality of politics. And the quality of a society clearly colors the quality of 
the life of individuals and of communities within that society. 
What are the pros and cons for applying a concept of democracy (quality of 
democracy) as comprehensively as is being done by the Democracy 
Ranking? Critics could claim that the democracy concept of the Democracy 
Ranking is too broad, confusing democracy with society and the economy. 
The Democracy Ranking, on the contrary, stresses that it would be 
(partially) “naïve”, wanting to talk about the qualities of politics and of 
democracies, but to ignore the qualities of societies and the economies. 
(Neglecting societies and their economies could result in creating electoral 
democracies, only with quality benefits for a wealthy upper class.) We 
already mentioned the theoretical links between “quality of results” of a 
democracy and “good governance”. One way of capturing good governance 
is to integrate conceptually performance (performance indicators) of the 
non-political dimensions into a quality-of-democracy model. Some 
academic scholars already analyzed specifically the performance of 
democracies. Arend Lijphart (1999) looks at performance in relation to 
different government types of democracies. Adam Przeworski et al. (2003) 
compare the economic development of democratic and non-democratic 
political regimes over the period 1950-1990. They emphasize a certain 
correlation between socio-economic development and democratization: 
“The most important lesson we have learned is that wealthy countries tend 
to be democratic not because democracies emerge as a consequence of 
economic development under dictatorships but because, however they 
emerge, democracies are more likely to survive in affluent societies” 
(Przeworski et al., 2003, p. 137). 
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The rationale for the five non-political dimensions of the Democracy 
Ranking is based on the following considerations:85 
1. Gender: Gender reflects a dimension that indicates, to a large extent, 
the degree of fairness in a society, thus relating to equality and 
freedom. Without gender fairness, the quality of a democracy is 
substantially constrained.86  
2. Economy: Economic indicators represent the degree of wealth that an 
economy and a society produce and that could be distributed (at least 
potentially) to enhance the wealth and quality-of-living of individuals 
and communities. Economic indicators supply information about 
economic and socio-economic potentials. Economic strength and 
performance sometimes also are being associated with freedom.87 
3. Knowledge: In a modern understanding, knowledge (research, 
education, innovation) is key for the performance of advanced 
knowledge-based economies and societies (Carayannis and Campbell, 
2006a). Several cross-connections are drawn between knowledge, 
innovation, and democracy (Saward, 2000; Von Hippel, 2005). The 
knowledge economy and knowledge society are complemented by a 
“knowledge-based democracy” (Carayannis and Campbell, 2006b).88 
                                     
85) See also Campbell and Sükösd, 2002, p. 6. 
86) It also would be interesting and important to address ethnicity or ethnic 
diversity, but currently the data documentation does not appear to be sufficient for 
a global international comparison of such issues. 
87) See on Wikipedia again the list of freedom indices: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indices_of_Freedom 
88) “Noneconomic aspects of knowledge stress that knowledge is crucial for 
enhancing a dynamic and high-quality democracy. … The knowledge-based 
economy, knowledge-based society, and knowledge-based democracy are 
concepts demonstrating how important knowledge is for understanding the 
dynamics of advanced societies” (Carayannis and Campbell, 2006b, pp. 4, 19). 
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Knowledge expedites the potentials for a society, economy and 
democracy.89 
4. Health: Health indicators, such as life expectancy, are sometimes more 
sensitive for distributional effects than economic indicators (for 
example, GDP per capita). Thus one could postulate that health 
indicators contain information about equality and potentially mirror 
also social welfare aspects.90 
5. Environment: Societies (politics, the economy) certainly have a 
responsibility for the environment. The environment represents a 
crucial context, and should the environment collapse, then societies 
are being severely impacted. Therefore, societies cannot ignore 
features of environmental sustainability.91 
The Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy assigns specific 
quantitative indicators to the different dimensions.92 The indicators for the 
                                     
89) Sodaro discusses “education and freedom of information” as a possible 
condition for democracy: “As a general rule, there is close correlation between 
democracy, on the one hand, and high educational levels and multiple sources of 
information on the other. This positive correlation is consistent with our 
hypothesis that education and free information can help promote democracy” 
(Sodaro, 2004, p. 219). We already cited O’Donnell (2004, p. 37), who considers 
“free, pluralistic, and nonmonopolized or state-censored information” as a 
necessary condition for the social context of a (high-quality) democracy. 
90) In this context we again want to cite Przeworksi et al. (2003) who claim that 
with regard to health indicators the democracies differ substantially from non-
democratic regimes: “The overall picture of life and death under the two political 
regimes is startling. Even if we assume that regimes face the same conditions, 
democracies have lower birth rates and lower death rates. Women in democracies 
have fewer children. More children survive adulthood. As adults, they live longer, 
years longer” (Przeworksi et al., 2003, p. 264). 
91) To illustrate this point further, we want to mention that the Human 
Development Report 2007/2008 discusses climate change and other 
environmental issues in greater detail (United Nations Development Programme, 
2007). 
92) For an exact documentation of the used indicators for the Democracy Ranking 
2008, see Campbell and Pölzlbauer (2008b, pp. 19-26).  
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five non-political dimensions reflect performance, by and large.93 This 
focus on performance allows for a nonpartisan and unbiased approach vis-
à-vis a political left and right (or liberal and conservative) scale, treating 
political ideologies, policies and values in a balanced format.94 For the 
political dimension, two key indicators are the “political rights” and the 
“civil liberties”, as they are being defined and annually published by 
Freedom House (e.g., Freedom House, 2008a). Within context of the 
political dimension, the political rights and civil liberties each are weighted 
by 25%. This should acknowledge the crucial importance of Freedom 
House, which releases the Map of Freedom data on freedom world-wide 
every year. We already shortly summarized the criticism raised against 
Freedom House (see again the discussion in Chapter 3). At the same time, 
however, it should be underscored that Freedom House engages in 
permanent procedures of improving and advancing its methodology (see, 
for example, Freedom House, 2008d). Freedom House, furthermore, 
publishes its survey results regularly, reliably and publicly accessible free 
of charge.95 It could be postulated that the Freedom House data on political 
rights and civil liberties reflect to a certain extent a conventional and 
established mainstream understanding about the distribution of freedom in 
the contemporary world. This prominent inclusion of Freedom House 
scores also implies that freedom is being crucially acknowledged by the 
Democracy Ranking as a key dimension of democracy and the quality of 
democracy. Other indicators for the political dimension are (Democracy 
Ranking 2008): the Gender Empowerment Measure, as being defined by 
                                     
93) The Democracy Ranking assigns gender indicators with a political orientation 
to the political dimension. The gender dimension, therefore, represents more a 
dimension of socio-economic gender equality. For the purpose of comparison and 
debate, the Democracy Ranking calculates also a “comprehensive gender 
dimension” (Campbell and Sükösd, 2002, p. 6; Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2008a, 
p. 7). 
94) For the Democracy Ranking 2008 (Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2008a) the 
performance indicators for the non-political dimensions were taken from the 
World Development Indicators source (World Bank, 2007). 
95) Here Freedom House follows a more open policy than The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (2008). 
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UNDP96; seats in parliament held by woman97; the “Press Freedom” index 
of Freedom House (e.g., Freedom House, 2008f)98; the “Corruption 
Perception Index” of Transparency International99; and changes and party 
changes of the “head of government”100. 
The methodic use of quantitative indicators imposes several consequences 
for Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy: (1) results for the 
ranking are “quantitative”, allowing the visualization of ranking scores 
across countries, time and different dimensions; (2) there is always a time-
lag between the ranking results and the actually present reality, because 
release and publication of the primary indicators (by renowned institutions) 
always implies the passing of a certain amount of time;101 (3) the socio-
economic developmental status, as a consequence of the conceptual model, 
impacts the quality-of-democracy ranking results, fostering a discussion 
who the “appropriate” peers would be for a “fair country comparison”; (4) 
because of the conceptual nature of the underlying model, there is always a 
possibility that for some countries the ranking results are not plausible, 
calling, therefore, for a detailed follow-up discussion of the ranking 
scores.102 
The coming work plan of the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of 
Democracy focuses on producing regularly and annually an indicator-based 
Democracy Ranking of all “free” and “partly free” countries in the world 
(according to the survey results of Freedom House), but circumventing the 
“not free” countries. In conceptual terms, this Democracy Ranking should 
                                     
96) For a definition, see: United Nations Development Programme, 2007, pp. 330-
333, 355, 360. 
97) For an application, see: United Nations Development Programme, 2007, pp. 
330-333. 
98) See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/historical/SSGlobal.xls 
99) See: http://www.transparency.org/publications/annual_report  
100) An important source for this type of information are the successive volumes 
of the Political Handbook of the World (for example, Banks et al., 2006). 
101) For example, the data time series of the World Development Indicators 2007 
(World Bank, 2007) end in 2005. 
102 ) See Campbell and Pölzlbauer (2008a, p. 4). 
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display a ranking of countries based on the quality of their democracies, 
employing a broad (comprehensive) conceptual (theoretical) framework for 
democracy: the basic concept for the Democracy Ranking follows the line 
of arguments as they are being illustrated in this chapter (Chapter 5).103 In 
addition to the Democracy Ranking, also a Democracy Improvement 
Ranking will be released that focuses on shifts in ranking scores. While in 
context of the Democracy Ranking we should expect a tendency that the 
developed countries (OECD104 countries) will rank highest, some 
developing or newly industrialized countries certainly have a potential in 
achieving top ranking scores (even outperforming the developed countries) 
for the Democracy Improvement Ranking. The Democracy Ranking 2008 
(Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2008a) documents method and ranking outcome 
for the years 2001-2002 and 2004-2005, while the Democracy Improvement 
Ranking 2008 (Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2008b) monitors changes over 
these two two-year intervals.105 
To depict the basic concept of the Democracy Ranking of the Quality of 
Democracy in a single core message, it appears useful to compare the 
Democracy Ranking directly to O’Donnell’s understanding of democracy 
(see Figure 5). The conceptual formula for the quality-of-democracy 
                                     
103) The homepage of the Democracy Ranking also states the vision, mission 
statement and objectives of this initiative. “The objectives of the Democracy 
Ranking are: (1) supporting democracy awareness and the awareness of the need 
for improving the quality of democracy; (2) contributing to processes of a self-
reflexive discussion and communication about democracy; (3) delivering 
empirical data for comparatively ranking democracies in a global format; (4) 
encouraging ongoing reforms, improvements and innovations of democracy for a 
further enhancement of the quality of democracy; (5) emphasizing the need for 
quality assurance and quality development of democracies and for systematic 
evaluations of democracy; (6) underscoring that for the development of the 
international community of countries the “dimension of democracy” is just as 
important as the other dimensions, such as the economy, knowledge, health and 
the environment; (7) adding to our theoretical and conceptual understanding of 
democracy also the quality of democracy and the advancement of democracies; 
(8) offering crucial input for a ‘Global Democracy Award’.” See: 
http://www.democracyranking.org/en  
104) OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
105) For an earlier pilot ranking see Campbell and Sükösd (2003). 
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approach of Guillermo O’Donnell106 can be summarized as: quality of 
democracy = (human rights) + (human development). The structure of 
the conceptual formula of the Democracy Ranking would be: quality of 
democracy = (freedom + other characteristics of the political system) + 
(performance of the non-political dimensions). This could feed into a 
discourse, how related or how distinct these two concepts of the quality of 
democracy are. Both interpretations appear feasible. 
Figure 5: Two different conceptual formuals for the
quality of democracy.
Approach of Guillermo O'Donnell:
Quality of 
Democracy       = (human rights) & (human development)
Approach of the "Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy":
Quality of 
Democracy       = (freedom & other characteristics 
of the political system)
& 
(performance of the non-political dimensions)
Note: "Freedom" according to "Freedom House".
Source for O'Donnell: 
Guillermo O'Donnell (2004). Human Development, Human Rights,
and Democracy, 9-92, in: Guillermo O'Donnell / Jorge Vargas Cullell /
Osvaldo M. Iazzetta (eds.): The Quality of Democracy. Theory and
Applications. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Source: Author's own conceptualization.
 
                                     
106) See again the résumé of O’Donnell’s thinking in Chapter 4. 
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